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ABSTRACT
Studies on mechanism design mostly focus on a single mar-
ket where sellers and buyers trade. This paper examines
the problem of mechanism design for capacity allocation in
two connected markets where a supplier allocates products
to a set of retailers and the retailers resale the products to
end-users in price competition. We consider the problems
of how allocation mechanisms in the upstream market de-
termine the behaviors of markets in the downstream market
and how pricing policy in the downstream market in°uences
the properties of allocation mechanisms. We classify an ef-
fective range of capacity that in°uences pricing strategies in
the downstream market according to allocated quantities.
Within the e®ective capacity range, we show that the re-
tailers tend to in°ate orders under proportional allocation,
but submit truthful orders under uniform allocation. We ob-
serve that heterogeneous allocations results in greater total
retailer pro¯t which is a unique phenomenon in our model.
The results would be applied to the design and analysis of
Business-to-Business (B2B) marketplaces and supply chain
management.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce;
I.2.1 [Arti¯cial Intelligence]: Applications and Expert
Systems|Games
General Terms
Design, Economics, Management
Keywords
Allocation mechanism design, supply chain management,
oligopoly
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mechanism design (MD) has been one of the most promis-
ing research topics in the ¯elds of e-business and arti¯cial
intelligence in recent years [8, 26, 22, 13]. The main concern
of MD is to induce truthful preferences from self-interested
agents. Studies on MD mostly focus on a single market
where sellers and buyers trade. However, in many situations,
traders' preferences are restricted to market situations. If
the traders are located in a supply chain, the information
about the traders' preferences can then be partially deduced
from the analysis of the market situations. Particularly, it is
interesting to show how such information could be applied
to mechanism design. In this paper we explore the problem
in the context of capacity allocation mechanisms.
Consider a supply chain where a supplier sells products to
a set of retailers. Suppose all orders from the retailers exceed
the capacity of the supplier. To solve unbalance of supply
and demand, allocation instead of an adjustment by price is
commonly observed in many supply chains. This is particu-
lar in the upper stream of supply chains such as component,
raw material and natural resource markets. The reasons
that allocation is favored in the upstream is changing price
are time consuming and costly for the customers. A change
of price of raw material involves the product cost controlling
of the customers and, in the worst case, the customer must
go back to a product design phase. In fact, a long-term
price contract is common and a spot price contract is ob-
served for a small amount of trades in such markets. Hence,
the price adjustment is not always proper method. When a
commodity supplier determines to allocate products, a num-
ber of working sta®s in a sales and operations department
ask customers about the truthful demand. This activity is
very common in industry and a typical procedure when the
supplier employs proportional allocation mechanism which
is the most popular mechanism. We show a reason why this
procedure is required under the mechanism. Furthermore,
we present how to induce truthful orders from the retailers
by an allocation mechanism.
There are two reasons for us to choose the subject. First,
capacity allocation is one of the most important issues in
computing-related applications, such as resource allocation [9,
1, 15], task allocation [17, 23]. Moreover, capacity alloca-
tion deals with the problem of scarce resources. A small
change of allocation in the upstream market would a®ect
the downstream markets signi¯cantly. Therefore the design
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into account.
In this paper, we consider a supply chain with two-connected
markets where a supplier allocates products to a set of retail-
ers (upstream market) and the retailers resale the products
to end-users (downstream market). We assume that the up-
stream market applies a certain allocation mechanism and
the downstream market applies a price competition. Our
interests are how the allocation mechanism applied in the
upstream market in°uences the competition among the re-
tailers in the downstream market and how a variation of
prices in the downstream market a®ects the behavior of the
allocation mechanism in the upstream market. We restrict
our analysis to two most popular and widely used allocation
mechanisms in industry, proportional allocation and uniform
allocation [7, 6]. We investigate the behavior of these two
allocation mechanisms by calculating the equilibria of the
retailers' order quantities and the price equilibria.
Our model is di®ered from a typical single-market model
such as [12, 31, 19, 27] with respect to the orders from the
retailers. In our model, the truthful orders are not sim-
ply determined from a given preference and an employed
mechanism. Due to a market competition, we take into ac-
count strategic interactions among the retailers for the order
determination. In our setting, a comprehension of market
rules in the downstream market is important to design al-
location mechanisms in the upstream market, because the
order quantities of retailer are restricted to the competition
in the downstream market. In other words, the order quan-
tity does not only represent private information, but also it
re°ects the e®ect of the price competition. We present that
the properties of allocation mechanisms are highly related
to market rules in the successive market. Cachon and Lar-
iviere [6] have made a contribution to the study of allocation
mechanism design in supply chain network based on the as-
sumption that the retailers in the downstream market enjoy
local monopolies. With such an assumption, each retailer
does not face in a direct competition. Therefore the order
quantities of the retailers become purely private information
similarly to the single-market model. It implies that no ex-
tra information from the downstream market is required to
design truth-inducing mechanisms.
Furuhata and Zhang [11] consider the problem by intro-
ducing competition into the downstream market. They con-
sider a simple case where the downstream market is in quan-
tity competition. However, in the real-world, price competi-
tion is more commonly applied market mechanism and much
more complicated in conjunction with allocation mechanism.
The complexity comes from the fact that retail price is deter-
mined by the market supply, i.e., the supplier's capacity, in
quantity competition, while individual sellers do determine
their selling prices in price competition. In fact, we observe
that the largest retailer can increase its selling price in spite
of having unsold products which even leads a greater overall
pro¯t (see Theorem 7). This phenomenon diverges not only
from Cournot quantity competition but also from Bertrand
price competition.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
our model. In Section 3, we classify e®ective ranges of the
capacity that in°uence pricing strategies in the downstream
market according to allocation quantities. In Section 4, we
show how the retailers place orders according to allocation
mechanisms and how retailers determine the retail prices.
Then, in Section 5, we focus on how allocation mechanisms
a®ect the total retailer pro¯t. Section 6 brie°y concludes
this paper.
2. MODEL
We consider a supply chain model with two connected
markets: a monopolistic upstream market (wholesale mar-
ket) and an oligopolistic downstream market (retail mar-
ket) as shown in Figure 1. In the upstream market, a sup-
plier sells products to intermediaries, called retailers. When
orders from the retailers exceed the capacity size of the
supplier, the supplier allocates products according to a se-
lected allocation mechanism. In the downstream market,
the retailers resale products to a range of end-users in price
competition. We investigate how a competitive model in
the downstream market a®ects properties of the allocation
mechanisms in the upstream market and how the allocation
mechanisms a®ect behaviors of the successive downstream
market. With such a supply chain model, the capacity allo-
Figure 1: Supply Chain Model
cation problem consists of two stages: order placement and
allocation in the upstream market; price setting and resale
to end-users in the downstream market.
2.1 Upstream Market
In the ¯rst stage, the supplier sets its capacity exogenously
denoted by K based on its own demand forecast, i.e. the
supplier does not know either a demand function of end-
user or how many quantities the retailers will order. Once
capacity K is determined, it is not able to change after-
wards. Then, the supplier selects an allocation mechanism
denoted by g by which the supplier allocates product where
the capacity is bound. The supplier noti¯es the selected
allocation mechanism to all retailers. Let N = f1;:::;ng
be the set of retailers usually noted i;j or k. Let us denote
j 6= i as all retailers except for retailer i. Let mi be an or-
der quantity of retailer i and let us denote ¡i as sum of all
quantities except for the quantity of retailer i, for instance,
m¡i =
P
j6=i
mj. Retailer i determines order quantity mi with
respect to market demand, allocation mechanism, and other
retailers' orders to maximize its pro¯t denoted by ¼i. Letus denote revenue of retailer i as ¦i. All retailers submit
their orders, m = (m1;:::;mn), simultaneously and inde-
pendently. We assume a wholesale price denoted by w is
¯xed, same for all retailers and determined exogenously. If
the total order quantity exceeds K, the supplier allocates
products according to the adopted allocation mechanism.
Let A = fa 2 <
n : a ¸ 0 &
n P
i=1
ai · Kg, where a vector
a ¸ 0 means for any component ai of the vector, ai ¸ 0. We
call each a 2 A a feasible allocation.
Definition 1. An allocation mechanism is a function g :
<
n ! A which assigns a feasible allocation to each vector of
orders such that for any retailers' order vector m, gi(m) ·
mi for each i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n.
Let gi(m
¤) be the allocation quantity of retailer i under
allocation mechanism g with respect to the vector of the
equilibrium order quantity m
¤. An allocation g is said to
be e±cient if
n P
i=1
gi(m) = K whenever
n P
i=1
mi ¸ K. For the
supplier, the e±cient allocation is the preferable one since
the capacity has been fully used.
The main concerns of mechanism design are e±ciency and
stability. For a supplier, capacity utilization is a key perfor-
mance index to evaluate its performance. If a mechanism
makes the capacity utilization increase, it is a preferable
mechanism for the supplier. A typical mechanism design cri-
terion in capacity allocation is individually responsive (IR)
which contributes to increase the capacity utilization.
Definition 2. An allocation mechanism g is said to be
IR if for any i,
m
0
i > mi and gi(m) < K imply gi(m
0
i;mj6=i) > gi(mi;mj6=i)
where m is a vector of retailers' orders, mi is the i's com-
ponent of m, mj6=i is a vector of the other retailers' orders,
and m
0
i is a variation of mi.
Under IR mechanisms, a retailer receives more allocations
if it orders more. Consequently, retailers frequently place
more orders than they actually need. On the other hand,
the in°ated orders prevent a right evaluation of the capacity
investment. When demand is unstable, the supplier often
fails to make decision on capacity planning due to lack of
truthful order information. Hence, a mechanism inducing
truthful order information from retailers is desirable mech-
anism design criteria. This criterion is formally represented
as follows:
Definition 3. An allocation mechanism g is said to be
incentive compatible (IC) or truth-inducing if all retailers
placing orders truthfully at their optimal sales quantities is
a Nash equilibrium of g, formally for all i:
¼i(gi(m
¤);gj6=i(m
¤)) ¸ ¼i(gi(mi;m
¤
j6=i);gj6=i(mi;m
¤
j6=i)):
2.2 Downstream Market
In the second stage, the retailers are in the price com-
petition in the downstream market. Let D(p) be the de-
mand of the end-users at price p and P(q) be its inverse
function where q stands for the total supply quantity. We
assume that the function P(q) is strictly positive on some
bounded interval (0; ^ q), on which it is twice-continuously dif-
ferentiable, strictly decreasing and concave. For q ¸ ^ q, we
simply assume P(q) = 0. In order to focus on interesting
cases, we assume retailers only have purchase costs w where
w < P(K). Let ai be the allocated quantity for retailer i
which has been determined in the ¯rst stage. Once retailers
are allocated by the supplier, the retailers determine prices
pi simultaneously and independently. Like Levitan and Shu-
bik [18] and Kreps and Scheinkman [16], we assume surplus
maximizing rule where the end-users choose from the lowest
price-o®ering retailers.
Here, we introduce following notations based on Cournot
quantity competition in order to describe a price competi-
tion. Let q¡i stands for
P
j6=i2N
qj. We de¯ne the best re-
sponse function for retailer i at cost w in Cournot quantity
competition as:
rw(q¡i) = argmax
qi
fqiP(qi + q¡i) ¡ wqig: (1)
We assume that qiP(qi + q¡i) ¡ wqi is concave in qi for all
q¡i. Based on this assumption, rw(q¡i) is a unique solution
of P(qi + q¡i) + qi
dP(qi+q¡i)
dqi ¡ w = 0 and satis¯es
¡1 <
@rw(q¡i)
@q¡i
< 0: (2)
Hence, rw(q¡i) + q¡i is increasing in q¡i. Let us denote
Cournot equilibrium at cost w as q
cw and the total Cournot
quantity as q
Cw =
N P
i=1
q
cw. Note that rw(q
cw
¡i) = q
cw. At the
special case where cost is zero, we denote q
c as the Cournot
equilibrium at zero cost and q
C as the total Cournot quan-
tity.
From now on, we show how retailers set the price. Let
us consider from the case where the supplier allocates the
product exclusively. Let i be the exclusively allocated re-
tailer enjoying the bene¯ts of the monopoly price p
M. Since
qP(q) is concave in q, where q 2 (0; ^ q), we have
q
M = argmax
q
qP(q): (3)
Therefore, the selling quantity is xi = minfq
M;aig. Hence
retailer i sets the monopoly price p
M = P(xi) to maximize
its pro¯t ¼i = xiP(xi) ¡ wai.
Now let us consider the case where the capacity is allo-
cated to several di®erent retailers. The remaining part of the
problem is how the retailers determine retail prices accord-
ing to the allocation. This pricing problem is similar to a
model proposed by Francesco [10] where several manufactur-
ers compete in price in an oligopolistic market with capac-
ity pre-commitments. When the pre-commitment of the ca-
pacity exceeds the best response quantity, the manufacturer
considers two options which are: (i) selling all products at a
lower price or (ii) selling a limited quantity at a higher price.
Francesco shows how the manufacturers choose the options.
Based on the option, Francesco shows price equilibria that
are dependent on the pre-committed capacity sizes. Notice
that the manufacturers in Francesco correspond to the re-
tailers in our model and the capacity pre-commitments cor-
respond to the allocation quantities. Before we describe the
relationship between allocation quantity and price equilib-
ria, we show the relationship between allocation and best
response (the lemma is based on Boccard and Wauthy [4,
5]).
Lemma 1. Given an e±cient allocation mechanism andlet a be the allocated quantities. Suppose ai > aj. If ai ·
r(a¡i) then aj < r(a¡j).
Proof. According to suppositions, we have a¡i < a¡j.
According to Equation (2), we have r(a¡i) < r(a¡j). Hence
we have aj < ai · r(a¡i) < r(a¡j).
According to lemma 1, if allocation ai is less than or equal
to its best response, the smaller allocation quantities sat-
isfy the same relationships. Furthermore, it implies, if the
largest allocation al satis¯es al · r(a¡l), then all the other
allocations have the same characteristic.
In [10], Francesco investigates price equilibria in both pure
strategy and mixed strategy. Now let us denote, ¹ p and p
as an upper and a lower bound of the price equilibrium
in the mixed strategy. The following lemma characterizes
the price equilibria that are a straightforward conversion
from the capacity sizes of the manufacturers in the model
of Francesco [10] to the allocated quantities of retailers in
terms of our model,
Lemma 2. [10] Given an allocation mechanism g, and or-
der m, let ai = gi(m). Let the largest allocated retailer
l = argmax
i2N
ai. Then
1. if for all i, ai · r(a¡i), P(ai + a¡i) is a unique equi-
librium.
2. if al > r(a¡l) and D(0) > a¡l, then
¹ pl = P(r(a¡l) + a¡l) ,
pi =
P(r(a¡l)+a¡l)r(a¡l)
al for all i, and
¦l = r(a¡l)P(r(a¡l) + a¡l),
3. if D(0) · a¡l, p
¤ = 0 is the unique price equilibrium.
Proof. If we view i and ai as a certain manufacturer and
its respective capacity choice in [10], the pricing problem in
the downstream market can be seen as the same problem as
Francesco [10]. See proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in [10].
According to Lemma 2, Francesco shows that there are three
types of price equilibria according to the patterns of alloca-
tions in our context. First, if an allocation quantity for each
retailer is less than or equals to its best response quantity,
the retailers set the price P(ai + a¡i). Second, if the allo-
cation quantity for the largest allocated retailer is greater
than its best response quantity and the sum of the alloca-
tions for the rest of retailers does not exceed the maximum
demand, the retailers set the price between p and ¹ p in mixed
strategy. Third, if the sum of the allocations for the retailers
except for the largest allocated retailer is greater or equals
to the maximum demand, the retailers set price zero. Once
we have the allocation quantities for the retailers, accord-
ing to Lemma 2, we know how the retailers choose pricing
strategies and the price equilibria in the downstream market.
Here, let us describe the di®erence between Bertrand price
competition and our price competition having capacity allo-
cation as constraints for the sales. In Bertrand competition,
the sellers do not have any upper bound for the selling quan-
tities. Hence, the equilibrium price becomes zero. For exam-
ple, if there is one seller sets the price lower than the others,
the lowest price o®ering seller dominates the whole market.
This is an incentive for the sellers to set lower prices. Con-
trary, the retailers have upper bounds (allocations) for the
selling quantities in our model. Therefore, there are some
residual demands for the retailers o®ering higher price un-
der certain circumstances. Hence, the price equilibria are
not always zero in our model as shown in Lemma 2.
Allocation quantity is one of the most in°uential factors
to determine selling prices. We address an issue: how many
allocation quantities are desirable in an oligopolistic price
competition with constraints? We follow the result of Kreps
and Scheinkman [16] to deal with the issue. The model of
Kreps and Scheinkman is a duopoly version of Francesco's
model. Kreps and Scheinkman show that the equilibrium of
the capacity pre-commitment is the Cournot quantity q
cw.
They assume that the manufacturers are able to determine
their amounts of capacity pre-commitments independently.
This assumption means that we do not have allocation con-
straints in our model. It implies that we are able to view
the Cournot quantity as a truthful demand in our model.
In the next section, we extend Lemma 2 in order to estab-
lish a link between capacity sizes and price equilibria which
is useful to know the e®ective range of capacity for pricing
strategies.
3. EFFECTSOFCAPACITYALLOCATION
TO THE DOWNSTREAM MARKET
Our interests are how capacity allocation in the upstream
market in°uences the market behaviors in the downstream
market and how the market rules in°uence the properties
of allocation mechanisms. Since it is not simple to ¯nd an
order equilibrium and a price equilibrium under certain al-
location mechanisms, this section aims to shrink a problem.
In this section, we ¯nd a price equilibrium according to the
capacity size. In other words, we aim to comprehend how
the retailers determine their prices under di®erent capacity
settings. In this section, we assume that the order quantity
is given and the total order quantity exceeds the capacity,
i.e. g is e±cient. Since the order quantity is given, we treat
the purchase cost as sunk cost.
Prior to investigation of the relationship between the sup-
plier's capacity and the retailers' pricing strategies, we would
like to emphasize some typical economical indicators which
have been shown in Section 2, such as q
M: the monopoly
quantity of the downstream market, q
C: the total Cournot
quantity in the oligopoly market, ^ q: the maximum demand
of the downstream market, and P(K): the market price cor-
responding to the quantity of K.
We divide the capacity ranges in four ranges for the anal-
ysis.
² Strictly scarce capacity (K · q
M ): the supplier's ca-
pacity K is less than the monopoly quantity q
M of the
downstream market.
² Relatively scarce capacity (q
M < K · q
C): the ca-
pacity is greater than the monopoly quantity and less
than or equal to the total Cournot quantity q
C.
² Enough capacity (q
C < K < ^ q): the capacity is greater
than the total Cournot quantity and less than the max-
imum demand of the downstream market.
² Excessive capacity ( ^ q · K): the capacity is greater
than the maximum demand.The following theorem deals with the ¯rst situation where
the capacity of the supplier is very limited (i.e. its capacity
size is less than the monopoly quantity).
Theorem 1. Given an allocation mechanism g. Suppose
that K · q
M and g is e±cient. If g is feasible, then P(K)
is an equilibrium, i.e., p
¤ = P(K)
Proof. According to Lemma 2, it is su±cient to show
that for any i; gi(m) · r(g¡i(m)). Since g is e±cient and
K · q
M, we have gi(m)+g¡i(m) = K · q
M = argmax
q
qP(q),
with respect to Equation (3).
Case 1: If r(g¡i(m)) + g¡i(m) ¸ q
M, we have
gi(m) + g¡i(m) · r(g¡i(m)) + g¡i(m):
It follows that gi(m) · r(g¡i(m)) as desired.
Case 2: Assume that r(g¡i(m)) + g¡i(m) < q
M. Ac-
cording to the de¯nition of Cournot best response function,
we have r(g¡i(m)) = argmax
qi
qiP(qi+g¡i(m)) = argmax
qi
((qi+
g¡i(m))P(qi + g¡i(m)) ¡ g¡i(m)P(qi + g¡i(m))). Let y =
qi+g¡i(m) and y
¤ = argmax
y
(yP(y)¡g¡i(m)P(y)); we have:
r(g¡i(m)) = argmax
y
(yP(y) ¡ g¡i(m)P(y)) ¡ g¡i(m)
= y
¤ ¡ g¡i(m) (4)
According to the assumption of Case 2, Equation (4) implies
y
¤ < q
M. It follows that P(y
¤) > P(q
M) because P is
strictly decreasing in quantity. It turns out that
¡g¡i(m)P(y
¤) < ¡g¡i(m)P(q
M)
Notice that the case g¡i(m) · 0 is ruled out since y
¤ < q
M.
On the other hand, y
¤P(y
¤) · q
MP(q
M) because q
M =
argmax
q
qP(q). Therefore, we have,
y
¤P(y
¤) ¡ g¡i(m)P(y
¤) < q
MP(q
M) ¡ g¡i(m)P(q
M)
This contradicts the de¯nition of y
¤. That is r(g¡i(m)) +
g¡i(m) ¸ q
M and we have gi(m) · r(g¡i(m)).
This theorem shows that the equilibrium price is P(K),
when the capacity size of the supplier is less than the market
monopoly quantity q
M and allocation mechanism is e±cient.
In this case, no retailers can make greater pro¯t by charg-
ing higher price than P(K), which is the monopoly price
when K · q
M. Therefore, the allocation mechanism does
not a®ect the market price within the capacity range. In
other words, in this context, the supplier has no interests to
choose a speci¯c allocation mechanism as long as the mech-
anism is e±cient.
Next, we consider the case where the capacity is relatively
scarce that is q
M < K · q
C. We have the following result:
Theorem 2. Suppose q
M < K · q
C. Under any e±-
cient allocation mechanism g, price equilibria are,
1. p
¤ = P(K), if for all i gi(m) · r(g¡i(m));
2. p
¤ > P(K), if there exists i such that gi(m) > r(g¡i(m)).
Proof. Since g is e±cient, we have
K
n · gl(m) · K.
It implies
n¡1
n K ¸ g¡l(m) ¸ 0. Since K < q
C, we have
n¡1
n K · q
c
¡i. According to Equation (2), we obtain r(q
c
¡i) ·
r(
n¡1
n K) · r(g¡l(m)) · r(0) = q
M. Therefore, we have ei-
ther gl(m) · r(g¡l(m)) or gl(m) > r(g¡l(m)). In the former
case, according to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 case 1, we have
p
¤ = P(K). In the later case, according to Lemma 2 case 2,
we have p
¤ > P(K).
According to Theorem 2, there are two types of pricing
strategies for the retailers, when the capacity is relatively
scarce. If allocation quantities for each retailer do not ex-
ceed the best response quantities, the market price is stable
and the equilibrium price reaches the price at the capacity
size, which is the statement 1. Otherwise, the market price
becomes unstable and higher than P(K), which is the state-
ment 2. This is a very interesting phenomenon. If there is a
retailer enjoying privilege from unbalance of allocation, the
equilibrium price in the downstream market is higher than
the balanced case. The following two extreme cases help to
understand the di®erence. If the supplier allocates the ca-
pacity exclusively to a retailer which is one case of the state-
ment 2, the retailer sets the resale price as P(q
M) > P(K)
to maximize its pro¯t, even if the retailer is not able to sell
all the products. On the other hand, if the supplier allocates
the capacity to all retailers equally, which is one case of the
statement 1, the mechanism of the price competition works
properly and the retailers are not able to increase their prof-
its by charging higher prices than P(K).
We turn to investigate a case where q
C < K < ^ q in the
following theorem,
Theorem 3. Suppose q
C < K < ^ q. For any e±cient
allocation mechanism g, p
¤ > P(K).
Proof. Since K < ^ q, for any g, we have gl(m) · K < ^ q.
Suppose, for all i, we have gi(m) · r(g¡i(m)). Accord-
ing to the de¯nition of Cournot best response function, we
obtain gi(m) · q
c
i. It implies
n P
i=1
gi(m) · q
C which is a
contradiction of the supposition of an e±cient allocation
n P
i=1
gi(m) = K. Hence, for retailer l, we have gl(m) >
r(g¡l(m)). According to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 case 2,
we have p
¤ > P(K).
According to Theorem 3, the retailers set the resale price
greater than P(K) if the capacity is in q
C < K < ^ q. In this
case, even if the allocation is equal to all retailers, the allo-
cation quantity is greater than the best response quantity.
Hence, the retailer sets the price higher than P(K) similarly
to the Statement 2 in Theorem 2.
Finally, we show the case K ¸ ^ q.
Theorem 4. Suppose K ¸ ^ q. For any e±cient allocation
mechanism,
1. p
¤ = 0, if g¡l(m) ¸ ^ q.
2. p
¤ > 0, otherwise.
Proof. Since K ¸ ^ q and g is e±cient, g satis¯es either
g¡l(m) ¸ ^ q or 0 · g¡l(m) < ^ q. The ¯rst case is the con-
dition of Lemma 2 case 3. Hence, we have p
¤ = 0. In the
later case, since
K
n > q
c, we obtain p
¤ > P(K) as same as
Theorem 3.According to Theorem 4, if ^ q · K and if the sum of the
all retailers' allocations excepts for the largest allocation ex-
ceeds the maximum demand, the equilibrium price is zero.
This is similar to the result of Bertrand price competition.
On the other hand, if the sum of the all retailers' allocations
excepts for the largest allocation that does not exceed the
maximum demand, the retailers are able to earn some prof-
its by setting the price higher than zero, but the pro¯ts are
very limited.
q ˆ
C q
M q 0
Capacity
) ( * K P p =
0 *= p
) ( * K P p >
Price Equlibria
Effective range on 
Pricing Strategy 
Selection
Figure 2: Capacity and Corresponding Pricing
Now, let us summarize the results of this section. We have
classi¯ed how capacity allocation in the upstream market
a®ects the pricing strategy and the price equilibria in the
downstream market as shown in Figure 2. The e®ective
range of the capacity for the pricing strategy selection is
q
M < K · q
C and a special case ^ q < K and g¡l(m) < ^ q.
A crucial range of capacity that a®ects the pricing strategy
selection is q
M < K · q
C. Within the capacity range, the
allocation mechanism selection is remarkably sensitive to the
downstream market. If K · q
M, the equilibrium price is
the monopoly price. If q
M < K · q
C, allocations gives a
signi¯cant impact on the price equilibria. If q
C < K < ^ q,
the price equilibria are sensitive to allocations. In the next
section, we relax the assumptions that are the given order
quantities and the total order quantity exceeds the capacity.
4. EFFECTSOFALLOCATIONMECHANISM
IN SUPPLY CHAIN
In the previous section, we have classi¯ed how capacity
allocation a®ects the pricing strategies and the price equi-
libria in the downstream market corresponding to the ca-
pacity size. In this section, we consider how the retailers set
order quantities based on allocation mechanisms and how
the retailers determine selling prices according to allocated
quantities in the supply chain. Particularly, we focus on two
popular allocation mechanisms in industry, uniform alloca-
tion and proportional allocation. Notice that the truthful
order quantity is q
Cw
i as shown in Section 2.
A main goal of this model with respect to mechanism de-
sign aspect is to obtain a truth-inducing mechanism. We
investigate market behaviors under uniform allocation pre-
sented in [28], which is a truth-inducing mechanism in [6]
and [11]. Under uniform allocation, the retailers are indexed
in ascending order of their order quantity, i.e., m1 · m2 ·
::: · mn. Let
¸ = max
(
i : K ¡ nm1 ¡
i P
j=2
(n ¡ l)(mj ¡ mj¡1) > 0
)
and
Figure 3: Uniform Allocation Mechanism
uniform allocation is,
gi(m) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
K=n; if nm1 > K;
mi; if i · ¸;
m¸+
Ã
K ¡ (n ¡ ¸ + 1)m¸ ¡
¸¡1 P
j=1
mj
!
=(n ¡ ¸);
otherwise:
Under uniform allocation mechanism, the retailers with or-
ders less than a threshold m¸ receive the same quantities
as respective orders, and the rest of retailers receive m¸
and the rest of capacity divided by the number of retail-
ers ordered greater than m¸. The threshold of m¸ is led
by the following procedure. If m1 £ n is greater than the
capacity, all retailers receive
K
n , otherwise, there is a thresh-
old m¸ where ¸ is greater than or equal to 1. In case of
m1 £n · K, the supplier counts up the number of retailers,
while
i P
j=1
mj + mj £ (n ¡ i) · K (the sum of i-th smallest
orders and the quantity of the i-th order times the number
of the rest of retailers is less than the capacity size of the
supplier). If the sum of orders is greater than or equal to
the capacity, the allocation quantity is equal to the capacity,
which is the area below the horizontal dashed line in Figure
3.
We have the following order quantity equilibria and the
price equilibria under uniform allocation.
Theorem 5. Under uniform allocation, there is a unique
equilibrium order quantity m
¤
i = q
cw in the upstream market,
which induces price equilibria p
¤
i = maxfP(K);P(q
Cw)g in
the downstream market.
Proof. If m
¤
i = q
cw
i for all i, according to the de¯nition
of uniform allocation, we have gi(m
¤) = minfq
cw
i ;K=ng ·
q
cw. Since gi(m
¤) · rw(g¡i(m
¤)) < r(g¡i(m
¤)), the pro¯t
of retailer i is
¼i = P(gi(m
¤) + g¡i(m
¤))gi(m
¤) ¡ wgi(m
¤): (5)
If m
0
i > m
¤
i and m
¤
j6=i = q
cw, we have gi(m
0) = gj6=i(m
0) =
K=n, which is the same allocation quantity to the case at m
¤.Hence, by increasing order m
0
i, retailer i cannot increase its
pro¯t. If m
0
i < m
¤
i, we have gi(m
0) ·
K
n · gj6=i(m
0) · q
cw.
We check whether this case ¯ts to the condition of case 2 of
Lemma 2. According to Equation (2), we have r(g¡i(m
0)) ·
r(g¡j(m
0)). Since gj6=i(m
0) · q
cw
j = rw(q
cw
¡j) < r(q
cw
¡j) ·
r(g¡i(m
0)) · r(g¡j(m
0)), this case does not satis¯es the
condition of case 2 of Lemma 2. Hence, we only consider the
case of the pure strategy. The pro¯t of retailer i is same as
Equation (5). Recall that Equation (5) is concave in gi(m)
and maximized at rw(g¡i(m)). Since gi(m
0) · rw(q
cw
¡i), by
decreasing m
0
i, ¼i is not increased. Therefore, we have an
equilibrium order quantity m
¤
i = q
cw
i , an allocation quantity
at gi(m
¤) = minfK=n;q
cw
i g, and an equilibrium price p
¤
i =
maxfP(K);P(q
Cw)g.
According to Theorem 5, all retailers place truthful order
quantities q
cw under uniform allocation, since no retailers
are able to increase their pro¯ts by increasing orders or de-
creasing orders from the truthful order quantity. An inter-
esting property of uniform allocation is its robustness of allo-
cation at the truthful order quantity. Even if competitors in-
crease their order quantities, the allocation quantity for the
retailer that submits the truthful order is not decreased. At
the equilibrium order quantity m
¤, we have allocation quan-
tities gi(m
¤) = minfK=n;q
cw
i g. Since the allocation quan-
tity for each retailer does not exceed the best response quan-
tities, we have the price equilibria p
¤
i = maxfP(K);P(q
Cw)g
under uniform allocation.
Uniform allocation satis¯es the truth-inducing property.
This is a very important criterion to choose an allocation
mechanism for mechanism designers. However, in most cases,
the supplier distributes products for several di®erent mar-
kets. Hence, proportions to ful¯ll the demands by alloca-
tions are di®erent under uniform allocation. An undesirable
point for the supplier is that the larger market is allocated
less proportion compared to the smaller market under uni-
form allocation.
In industry, the most commonly used allocation is pro-
portional allocation, which is a representative IR allocation
mechanism. An allocation mechanism g is proportional al-
location if
gi(m) = min
(
mi;Kmi=
N X
j=1
mj
)
: (6)
In other words, whenever capacity binds, allocated quan-
tity to each retailer is the same fraction of its order under
the proportional allocation. Similarly to Cachon and Lariv-
iere [6], we show that the retailers in°ate orders and there is
no equilibrium under proportional allocation in our model.
Theorem 6. There does not exist an order equilibrium
m
¤ under proportional allocation, if K · q
Cw.
Proof. Suppose there exists symmetric m
¤. Let us de-
note ¼i(g(m)) = ¼i(gi(m);gj6=i(m)). Since K · q
Cw, we
have gi(m
¤) · q
cw and g¡i(m
¤) · q
cw
¡i. It turns out r(g¡i(m
¤)) ¸
r(q
cw
¡i). Since gi(m
¤) · q
cw
i = rw(q
cw
¡i) < r(q
cw
¡i) · r(g¡i(m
¤)),
the pro¯t of retailer i is ¼i(g(m
¤)) = P(gi(m
¤)+g¡i(m
¤))gi(m
¤)¡
wgi(m
¤), according to Lemma 2 case 1. Let m
0 = (m
0
i;m
¤
j6=i).
Equation (6) implies gi(m
0) > gi(m
¤) where m
0
i > m
¤
i.
If
P
i2N
m
¤
i < K, we have gl(m
0) such that gl(m
0) < q
cw
l .
Equation (6) implies g¡l(m
0) · g¡l(m
¤) and r(g¡l(m
0)) ¸
r(g¡l(m
¤)). It turns out that gl(m
0) < q
cw
l = rw(q
cw
¡l) <
r(g¡l(m
¤)) · r(g¡l(m
0)). According to Lemma 2 case 1, we
have ¼l(g(m
0)) = P(gl(m
0)+g¡l(m
0))gl(m
0)¡wgl(m
0). Ac-
cording to the concavity of the pro¯t function and gi(m
¤) <
gl(m
0) · r(g¡l(m
0)), we have ¼l(g(m
0)) > ¼i(g(m
¤)). Hence,
symmetric m
¤ does not exist in the case of
P
i2N
m
¤
i < K.
If
P
i2N
m
¤
i ¸ K, Equation (6) implies gl(m
0) ¡ gl(m
¤) =
¡(g¡l(m
0) ¡ g¡l(m
¤)) where m
0
l > m
¤
l . It follows gl(m
0) <
r(g¡l(m
0)) and ¼l(g(m
0)) = P(gl(m
0) + g¡l(m
0))gl(m
0) ¡
wgl(m
0). The di®erence between ¼l(g(m
0)) and ¼i(g(m
¤))
is (gl(m
0)¡gi(m
¤))(P(K)¡w). According to the assumption
of w, we have ¼l(g(m
0)) > ¼i(g(m
¤)). Hence, symmetric m
¤
does not exist in the case of
P
i2N
m
¤
i ¸ K.
Suppose there exists asymmetric m
¤ such that gl(m
¤) <
r(g¡l(m
¤)). The supposition is contradicted similarly to the
case of symmetric m
¤ and
P
i2N
m
¤
i < K.
Suppose there exists asymmetric m
¤ such that gl(m
¤) >
r(g¡l(m
¤)). The pro¯t of retailer l is
¼l(g(m
¤)) = P(r(g¡l(m
¤))+g¡l(m
¤))r(g¡l(m
¤))¡wgl(m
¤);
according to Lemma 2 case 2. Similarly, the pro¯t of retailer
i where m
¤
i < m
¤
l is
¼i(g(m
¤)) =
P(r(g¡l(m
¤)) + g¡l(m
¤))r(g¡l(m
¤))
gl(m¤)
gi(m
¤)
¡ wgi(m
¤):
The di®erence of pro¯ts between retailer l and i is
¼l(g(m
¤)) ¡ ¼i(g(m
¤)) =
gl(m
¤) ¡ gi(m
¤)
gl(m¤)
(P(r(g¡l(m
¤)) + g¡l(m
¤))r(g¡l(m
¤)) ¡ wgl(m
¤)):
At the equilibrium, ¼l(g(m
¤)) must be positive. Notice that
¼l(g(m
¤)) = P(r(g¡l(m
¤))+g¡l(m
¤))r(g¡l(m
¤))¡wgl(m
¤).
Hence, we have ¼l(g(m
¤)) > ¼i(g(m
¤)). It follows that
asymmetric m
¤ such that gl(m
¤) > r(g¡l(m
¤)) does not
exist.
According to Theorem 6, there does not exist an equilib-
rium in order quantity under proportional allocation where
the retailers tends to increase their order quantities more
than they need. Under proportional allocation, each retailer
is able to decrease the competitors' allocations by increas-
ing its order that makes greater pro¯ts for each retailer.
Thus, proportional allocation is not robust and the supplier
receives more order quantities than actual needs.
One way to obtain an order equilibrium under propor-
tional allocation is to assume a maximum order quantity
denoted by ~ m. In reality, we frequently encounter the case
where there exists a maximum order quantity, which is deter-
mined by either the supplier side or the retailer side. In this
case, according to Theorem 6, we are easily able to obtain
the equilibrium order quantity m
¤
i = ~ mi. The interesting
case of the capacity range is K ·
n P
i=1
~ mi. If the maximum
order quantity is symmetric, we have allocation gi(m
¤) =
K
n
and the equilibrium price p
¤ = P(K), which is the same
price as the quantity competition shown in [11]. If it is
asymmetric, we obtain allocation gi(m
¤) = Km
¤
i=
n P
i=1
m
¤
i.
The equilibrium price is either p
¤ = P(K) or p
¤ > P(K),which is dependent on a relationship between the largest
allocation gl(m
¤) and its best response r(g¡l(m
¤). If the
maximum order quantities are heterogeneous and the allo-
cation for the largest allocated retailer exceeds its best re-
sponse quantity, the retailers set their resale price greater
than P(K) which is a unique phenomenon in this model
compared to the quantity competition in [11].
5. HETEROGENEOUS ALLOCATIONS
In industry, the allocation quantities are not always equal.
For example, under proportional allocation with maximum
order quantity shown in the previous section, it is commonly
observed that some prioritized customers have the greater
maximum order quantities. As we have seen in Theorem 2,
the di®erence of allocation quantities to the retailers a®ects
the pricing strategies and the largest allocated retailer in-
creases the selling price to enjoy the bene¯t of the privileged
allocation. This is a unique phenomenon in our model. In
this section, we further investigate how heterogeneous allo-
cations a®ect the total retailer pro¯t.
In the exclusive distribution model in [6], the most im-
portant design criteria is Pareto optimality. Here, Pareto
optimality means that under allocation mechanism that sat-
is¯es Pareto optimal criteria the total retailer pro¯t is max-
imized, if all retailers submit orders truthfully. However, in
our model, to allocate all the products to a single retailer
is a way to maximize the total retailer pro¯t. Therefore,
Pareto optimality is not a signi¯cant criterion in our model.
Meanwhile, it does not mean the total retailer pro¯t is not
important. The supplier frequently encounters a situation
where the supplier needs to give some privileges to some re-
tailers on allocation. We investigate how heterogeneousness
of allocation make an impact for the total retailer pro¯t.
We focus on the interesting capacity range q
M < K · q
C
as shown in Section 3. Let us call g
P as a strong hetero-
geneous allocation which satis¯es the condition of case 1 in
Lemma 2 and let us call g
M as a non strong heterogeneous
allocation for the condition of case 2. According to these
conditions, mechanisms g
M re°ects the case where some re-
tailers have been privileged. Notice that a symmetric allo-
cation is included in g
P, since K · q
C.
Let us remind that strong heterogeneous allocation corre-
sponds to statement 2 in Theorem 2 and non strong hetero-
geneous allocation corresponds to statement 1 in Theorem 2.
Within the capacity range q
M < K · q
C, the retailers have
two types of pricing strategies and price equilibria. It is cer-
tain that the largest allocated retailer earns greater pro¯t
under strong heterogeneous allocation than the pro¯t un-
der non strong heterogeneous allocation. However, we have
one question whether the higher equilibrium price under non
strong heterogeneous allocation results in the total retailer
pro¯t greater. The following theorem corresponds to this
question.
Theorem 7. Suppose that q
M < K · q
C. For any e±-
cient g
P(m) and g
M(m),
P
i2N
¼i(g
M(m)) >
P
i2N
¼i(g
P(m)).
Proof. Let ¼i(g(m)) = ¼i(gi(m);gj6=i(m)). First we
show the total retailers' pro¯t under g
P. According to the
case 1 of Lemma 2, the total retailers' pro¯t is
X
i2N
¼i(g
P(m)) =
X
i2N
³
P(K)g
P
i (m) ¡ wg
P
i (m)
´
=P(K)K ¡ wK: (7)
Now we show the case of g
M. If g
M
l (m) 6= K, according to
the case 2 of Lemma 2, the total retailers' pro¯t is
X
i2n
¼i(g
M(m)) =
X
i2n
³
pig
M
i (m) ¡ wg
M
i (m)
´
:
We have p
¤ > P(K) under g
M according to Theorem 2.
Hence, we have
X
i2n
¼i(g
M(m)) = pK ¡ wK > P(K)K ¡ wK: (8)
According to Equation (7) and (8), we obtain
X
i2n
¼i(g
M(m)) >
X
i2N
¼i(g
P(m)):
If g
M
l (m) = K, retailer l is a monopolist. Hence, we have
¼l >
P
i2n
¼i(g
P(m)) according to Equation (7) and K >
q
M.
According to Theorem 7, under strong heterogeneous allo-
cation g
M, the total retailer pro¯t is greater than the one
under non strong heterogeneous allocation g
P, when the ca-
pacity of the supplier is relatively scarce. Since there is
no di®erence with respect to the total cost of all retailers
between g
M and g
P, we focus on the revenue. The total
revenue is P(K)K under g
P. Meanwhile, the total revenue
is pK under g
M. At ¯rst glance, it seems inconsistent, be-
cause the market demand cannot be K if the retail price is
p > P(K) under g
M. However, pK consists of the revenues
of all retailers and they do not set price p at once. In fact,
the total selling quantity under g
M is less than K, since
the selling quantity of retailer i at price ¹ p is less than g
M
i .
Notice that the pro¯t of the mixed strategy is equal at any
price between p and ¹ p. Therefore, it implies that even if
the less prioritized retailers under g
M decrease their pro¯ts
compared to the ones under g
P, the increasing amount of
the pro¯ts of the prioritized retailers exceeds the decreasing
amount of the less prioritized retailers.
The phenomenon that the heterogeneousness of allocation
a®ects the total retailer pro¯t shown above is not observed in
the quantity competition model in [11]. In quantity compe-
tition, the price is determined by the total supply quantity.
Hence, the individual supply quantities do not a®ect the
market price. Hence, the heterogeneousness of allocation is
not a signi¯cant point to consider the total retailer pro¯t in
Furuhata and Zhang's model [11].
6. CONCLUSION AND RELATED WORK
In this paper we studied capacity allocation problems in
a supply chain where a supplier allocates capacity to a set
of retailers and the retailers compete in price competition in
a same market. We showed how the capacity allocations in
the upstream market a®ect the pricing strategy selection and
the price equilibria in the downstream market. According to
the classi¯cation of the e®ective range of the capacity that
a®ects the market behaviors in the downstream market, weare able to know the crucial capacity ranges to choose the
allocation mechanisms.
With the equilibrium analysis on purchasing and pricing,
we investigated the e®ects of allocation mechanisms in sup-
ply chain, especially for two popular allocation mechanisms,
uniform allocation and proportional allocation. We found
that the equilibrium order quantity would not always be
Cournot quantity in our model. This is a signi¯cant di®er-
ence from the result of the Kreps and Scheinkman's model.
The di®erence is observed in a situation where the retailers
are able to decrease their competitors' allocation quantities
under certain allocation mechanisms such as proportional al-
location. Under proportional allocation, the retailers in°ate
orders to be allocated more than competitors. Contrary,
we showed that uniform allocation induces truthful order
quantity from the retailers under which we have the same
equilibrium price as Furuhata and Zhang [11].
We observed a unique phenomenon in our model that is
heterogeneousness of allocations results in higher market
price if capacity is relatively scarce. Furthermore, the to-
tal retailer pro¯t is increased in this case, even though some
retailers decrease their pro¯ts. In quantity competition, the
total market supply determines the market price, thus the
price is not a®ected by heterogeneousness of allocations. On
the other hand, each retailer determines the selling price
in price competition with allocation constrains. Therefore,
the privileged retailers are able take an opportunity to set
higher price for the residual demand, because less prioritized
retailers are not able to ful¯ll all the demand. In our model,
the total retailer pro¯t is maximized, where the supplier ex-
clusively allocates to a single retailer. It means that one
important criteria, Pareto optimality, in Cachon and Lar-
iviere's model [6] is not a signi¯cant criteria in our model.
Hence, truth-inducing property enhances the signi¯cance of
mechanism design criteria.
In this model, choosing an allocation is a trade-o® between
the e±ciency goal and the stability goal. IR allocation leads
an order in°ation that contributes for a higher utilization
of the capacity and a greater pro¯t for the supplier. How-
ever, the supplier lacks of the accurate demand information.
This is a serious problem, since the accurate demand is a
fundamental input for all business planning for the supplier.
The retailers encounter uncertain allocations and unstable
prices under IR allocations. However, there is a way to in-
crease their pro¯ts by ordering more. Contrary, the truth-
inducing allocations let the supplier obtain the truthful de-
mand. However it may not be the pro¯t-maximizing. The
orders, the allocations and the prices become stable for the
retailers. Overall, choosing an allocation mechanism is not
just choosing one policy for allocation, but also it in°uences
the market behaviors through a supply chain. We believe
that our model represents typical phenomena in many sup-
ply chains.
This paper integrates techniques of equilibrium analysis
in Economics [16, 10] for a comprehension of market rules
and mechanism design of capacity allocation [6, 20, 11].
Our market model in the downstream market is similar
to Kreps and Scheinkman's model [16] where sellers are in
a price competition in a duopoly with pre-commitment of
supply limit for each seller. The main di®erence is that our
model has an allocation process. Once allocation is executed
in our model, by treating allocated quantity as supply limit,
the market behavior can be explained similarly. However,
in our model, each retailer is not able to determine alloca-
tion quantity (supply limit) which is dependent on allocation
mechanisms and the market behaviors in the upstream mar-
ket. Meanwhile, each seller is able to determine its supply
limit independently in the Kreps and Scheinkman's model.
Therefore, our model deals with more complex business sce-
nario and it is very general transactions in daily business.
Since Kreps and Scheinkman [16], several works on price
competition with capacity constraints have been made. A
¯rst stream of research extends the results of the Kreps and
Scheinkman. Vives [29] shows price equilibria in a symmet-
ric oligopoly case with common capacity constraints among
sellers. Francesco [10] extends the Kreps and Scheinkman
model from a duopoly to an oligopoly. A second stream
of research shows the limits of the Kreps and Scheinkman
model by assuming asymmetric cases, including imperfect
capacity pre-commitment [4, 5] and uncertain demand [25].
The di®erence of the two streams is caused by the symmet-
ric behavior in the models. Our model is relevant to both
streams of these literatures, since feasible allocations cover
both symmetric and asymmetric cases.
The two-connected market model is common in industrial
organization. The major works are vertical integration and
multilateral vertical contracting in [14, 21, 24]. The aims
of these papers are closely related to ours. They show how
market rules in the downstream market a®ects the strate-
gic choice in the upstream market and how strategic choice
in°uences the market behavior in the downstream market.
However, they do not consider capacity allocation mecha-
nisms in the two-connected market model.
Understanding the market behaviors based on the market
rule in the successive market is important to design alloca-
tion mechanisms in supply chain management, since allo-
cation mechanisms a®ect market behaviors in the successive
markets and the market behaviors based on the market rules
a®ect some properties of mechanisms. This point is a main
di®erence from some works of mechanism design for supply
chain models [6, 2, 20, 30, 3] except for [11]. Therefore,
our results are useful in order to design and analyze B2B
marketplaces and supply chain management.
For future work, it is important to consider market mech-
anism design in dynamic environments. Recently, some re-
searches proposes approaches on mechanism design in a dy-
namic environment [8, 26, 22, 13]. However, they are re-
stricted to a single market. We would like to propose and
develop an adaptive supply chain solution on e-marketplaces
for the future work.
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